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Nombre de programmes trouvés : 10572
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le (59m5s)

The Optimal Design of a Constitution-making Process

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Jon Elster.There are two normative questions one might ask about constitutions: What is a good constitution? What is a good constitution-making process? In the paper I mainly focus on the second issue, but also discuss the relation between the two. Important desiderata of a constituent assembly include having a number of delegates that is both large enough to prevent bargaining and small enough to allow for a genuine exchange of views; ...
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le (57m18s)

The Optimal Rule of Decision-making for Areopagus: Public Voting or Apparent Consens?

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Philippe Urfalino.Areopagus, as are constitutional courts and committees of experts, are expected to reach decisions which must be justified by reasons. Their members are not elected but appointed with a reference to their specific competence. With regard to the nature of the decisions they make and the intellectual quality of their members, areopagus are strongly associated with an idea of a certain kind of wisdom. One of the questions areopagus are ...
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Conférences

le (1h1m52s)

Group Deliberation and the Revision of Individual Judgments: A Social-Choice-Theoretic Perspective

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Christian List.While a large social-choice-theoretic literature discusses the aggregation of individual judgments into collective ones, there is relatively little formal work on the revision of individual judgments in group deliberation. I develop a model of judgment revision and prove a baseline impossibility result: any judgment revision function satisfying some initially plausible conditions is the identity function, under which no opinion change occurs. I identify escape routes from this impossibility and argue ...
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Conférences

le (55m42s)

Microfoundations of Collective Wisdom

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Scott Page.In this paper, I demonstrate the microfoundations of collective wisdom. I show the benefits and limits of diverse categorizations and show the power of predictive models based on diverse perspectives. The model demonstrates both the potential for the wisdom of crowds and the possibility that the crowd may make systematic mistakes.
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Conférences

le (1h6m40s)

Democratic Authority: A Philosophical Framework

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de David Estlund.“In this talk, I give an overview of the argument of my new book of the same title. Democracy is not naturally plausible. Why turn such important matters over to masses of people who have no special expertise? Theories of the value of democracy often try to answer this question by appeal to the intrinsic value of the procedure itself, without relying on any tendency toward good decisions. In this ...
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Conférences

le (1h3m46s)

Democratic Reason : The Mechanisms of Collective Intelligence in Politics

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Hélène Landemore.In this paper, Landemore argues that democratic institutions can be seen as ways to channel “democratic reason,” or the distributed intelligence of the many—a concept that she builds in part on the insights of the cognitive sciences. She argues that two main democratic mechanisms—the practice of inclusive deliberation (in its direct and indirect versions) and the institution of majority rule (aggregation of judgments through voting)—combine their epistemic properties to maximize ...
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Conférences

le (53m36s)

Majorities Against Utility : Implications of the Failure of the Miracle of Aggregation

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Bryan Caplan, George Mason University, 23 mai 2008A surprising conclusion of modern political economy is that democracies with highly ignorant voters can still deliver very good results as long as voters' errors balance each other out. This result is known as the Miracle of Aggregation. This paper begins by reviewing a large body of evidence against this Miracle. Empirically, voters' errors tend to be systematic; they compound rather than cancel.Furthermore, since ...
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Conférences

le (46m58s)

Rational Ignorance and Beyond

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Gerry Mackie, University of California, San Diego, 23 mai 2008Economic theories declare that voters in a democracy are rationally ignorant (or worse, irrational) about politics, but that consumers possess perfect information about decisions in the market. Citizens lack competence because an individual voter almost never is pivotal to the outcome of an election (Downs, Brennan), or because of a lowered sense of responsibility in crowds (LeBon, Schumpeter), or because humans intrinsically ...
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Conférences

le (59m51s)

Wise International Decisions: The Bigger, the Wiser?

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Ariel Colonomos, CNRS, CERI, 23 mai 2008When he makes strategic choices, the Prince favors prudence. This is one of the basic conclusions of the realist school of international relations. Although this is highly debatable, classical realists consider that state leaders are prudent to the extent that they do not inadvertently attack bigger states likely to defeat them (i.e. they maximize their interest). Realists are also normative at least implicitly: states ought ...
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Conférences

le (1h5m20s)

Many-Minds Arguments in Legal Theory

La sagesse collective : principes et mécanismesColloque des 22-23 mai 2008, organisé par l'Institut du Monde Contemporain du Collège de France, sous la direction du Professeur Jon Elster.Intervention de Adrian Vermeule, Harvard Law School, 23 mai 2008Many-minds arguments are flooding into legal theory. Such arguments claim that in some way or another, many heads are better than one; the genus includes many species, such as arguments about how legal and political institutions aggregate information, evolutionary analyses of those institutions, claims about the benefits of tradition as a source of law, and analyses of the virtues and vices of deliberation.This essay ...
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