Majority judgment: a new voting method

Durée : 01:43:56 -Réalisation : 11 décembre 2018 -Mise en ligne : 11 décembre 2018
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The traditional theory of social choice offers no acceptable solution to the problems of how to elect, to judge, or to rank. The classical model —transforming the “preference lists” of individuals into a “preference list” of society— is fundamentally flawed in both theory and practice. We propose a more realistic model where voters evaluate the candidates in a common language of ordinal grades. This small change leads to an entirely new theory and method: « majority judgment ». It is at once meaningful, resists strategic manipulation, elicits honesty, and is not subject to the classical paradoxes encountered in practice, notably Condorcet’s and Arrow’s. We offer theoretical, practical, and experimental evidence—from national elections to figure skating competitions—to support the arguments.

Langue :
CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique (Publication), INRIA (Institut national de recherche en informatique et automatique) (Production), INRIA (Institut national de recherche en informatique et automatique) (Publication), UNS (Publication), Rida Laraki (Intervenant)
Conditions d'utilisation
Droit commun de la propriété intellectuelle
Citer cette ressource :
Rida Laraki. Inria. (2018, 11 décembre). Majority judgment: a new voting method. [Vidéo]. Canal-U. (Consultée le 2 octobre 2023)


Balinski M. and R. Laraki (2007), A Theory of Measuring, Electing and Ranking, PNAS, 104(2), 8720-8725.
B & L (2011), Majority Judgment: Measuring, Ranking, and Electing, MIT Press.
B & L (2014). Judge: Don’t vote. Operations Research, 28, 483-511.
B & L (2017), Majority Judgment vs Majority Rule, preprint.
B & L (2018), Majority Judgment vs Approval Voting, preprint.

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